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I. BEGINNINGS 
From the time I took Bob Gorman’s1 copyright course in law school, I knew this 
was my calling in the law.  What I had no idea as to was how to accomplish that.  My 
second summer, I accepted an offer to practice at Weil, Gotshal & Manges—about 
which I knew little beyond a recommendation from a family acquaintance that I 
interview the firm.   
Serendipity. 
The firm was all of 85 lawyers—full of energy and a sense of destiny—led by 
foresightful and entrepreneurial Columbia Law School graduates,  Ira Millstein, who 
became my mentor, and bankruptcy giant Harvey Miller. 
I was impressed by the firm’s intellectual rigor; its empowerment of young 
associates; its informality; its inclusiveness.  The firm was already on the map in its 
antitrust and bankruptcy practices.  All good—but where was my copyright practice? 
Sitting in my library cubicle that summer, I was approached by the partner in 
charge of the summer recruitment program and told that I had been selected to have 
lunch with Horace Manges.  I was aware that the firm bore his name, that he had a 
large corner office, that he was of advanced age (from my then-perspective!), and 
that none of the summer associates had so much as laid eyes on him.  I knew little 
else. 
By the date of my lunch appointment, I had done my homework and—lo and 
behold—came to learn that he was a luminary in the copyright field.  Horace was a 
 
 * Mr. Rich is a senior partner at the law firm Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, where he has headed 
(and now co-heads) the firm’s Intellectual Property/Media practice. 
 1. Robert A. Gorman joined the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania Law School in 1965 
and became a Professor Emeritus in 2000.  Robert A. Gorman, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW 
SCHOOL, https://perma.cc/P4ZA-HQMK (last visited Sept. 24, 2018); Professor Gorman delivered the 
2001 Manges Lecture.  The Annual Horace S. Manges Lecture, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL, 
https://perma.cc/E44P-6VXY (last visited Sept. 24, 2018). 
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graduate of Columbia College and this law school who, along with two other 
Columbia Law School graduates, Frank Weil and Sylvan Gotshal, founded the firm 
in the heart of the Depression in 1931. 
Building on his own serendipity—having been a college roommate of Bennett 
Cerf, one of the founders of Random House—Horace went on to become an authority 
on copyright law.  He served as counsel to the predecessor to today’s Association of 
American Publishers, the American Book Publishers Council, advised Random 
House, Doubleday, and Charles Scribner, among other publishers, and represented 
renowned authors including William Faulkner, John O’Hara, Truman Capote, 
Whitaker Chambers, and James Jones. 
Horace was an active and persuasive voice in the shaping of the 1976 Copyright 
Act.  The legislative history abounds in references to Horace’s advocacy on behalf 
of authors and publishers relating to the myriad controversial issues presented.2 
Horace was equally a staunch defender of the speech and press freedoms guaranteed 
by the First Amendment.  Unbowed by orthodoxy in terms of acceptable or 
inoffensive speech, he defended author John O’Hara and Bantam Books against 
criminal obscenity charges relating to publication of the book Ten North Frederick,3 
and successfully argued the landmark prior restraint case, Bantam Books, Inc. v. 
Sullivan, before the U.S. Supreme Court.4 
While I was absorbed in all of this over our lunch, Horace was intent on gaining 
insight into my generation of law students, as well as my perceptions of the law firm.  
Though modest in size by today’s standards, to Horace, the firm was growing in rapid 
and increasingly difficult-to-comprehend ways.5  
I could not then have predicted that I, along with other talented colleagues at the 
firm, including a number who are here today, would be privileged to carry forward, 
and build on, the luminous literary property practice that Horace had built.  Nor could 
we yet appreciate the many intellectual challenges doing so would pose. 
Following graduation, I began full time at the firm working in our antitrust and 
trade regulation practice, under Ira Millstein’s tutelage.6  I semi-jokingly tell people 
that in those early years I learned everything I know about antitrust law—so, beware.  
But, in truth, it was an amazing learning platform.  With Ira as my (generally) patient 
tutor, I developed the necessary substantive expertise, learned to litigate 
sophisticated matters usually lacking clear answers, strived to emulate him by being 
 
 2. See, e.g., Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R. 6835 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary 
Comm., 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 128–36 (1965) (testimony of Horace Manges, Counsel to American Book 
Publishers Council, Inc.), available at https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.$b655184; Copyright Law 
Revision:  Studies prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1961), available at https://perma.cc/D7M6-VBU9. 
 3. People v. Bantam Books, Inc., 172 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct. 1958). 
 4. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963). 
 5. Weil had some 85 lawyers as of 1972, the date of this lunch.  Today it has more than 1000. 
 6. Ira Millstein, a 1947 graduate of Columbia University and a 1949 graduate of Columbia 
University School of Law, has, over his career, served as Chairman of the Antitrust Law Sections of both 
the American Bar Association and the New York State Bar Association, and is Founding Chair of the 
Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership at Columbia Law School.  Ira M. Millstein, 
WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, https://perma.cc/M8DH-M8EW (last visited Oct. 9, 2018).  
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the most creative and most prepared lawyer in the courtroom, and took copious 
mental notes observing Ira’s masterful ability to wow clients and judges alike. 
Horace’s literary property practice was in my early years a small portion of the 
firm’s overall work.  The firm’s most talented next-generation practitioner, Heather 
Florence, who also is here today, and who is yet another Columbia Law School 
graduate, handled much of that work, including coordinating the work of the AAP’s 
First Amendment arm—the Freedom to Read Committee. 
Was there any path for me? 
Serendipity. 
A year into my practice, Heather decided to join Victor Kovner, another Columbia 
Law School alumnus, to devote herself full-time to this practice area.  Heather 
continued her distinguished career as general counsel to Bantam, Doubleday Dell 
Publishing.  In her place, I was invited by Ira to take over the AAP First Amendment 
counsel role.  My qualifications?  Per Ira, “You are a great brief writer. You just need 
to write some amicus briefs to the U.S. Supreme Court!” 
Thrown into the literary lion’s den at monthly Freedom to Read Committee 
meetings with iconic publishing executives the likes of Brooks Thomas,7 Tom 
McCormack,8 Tony Schulte,9 Betty Prashker,10 and Simon Michael Bessie,11 my 
literary property career was thus launched, and I never looked back. 
II. THE PRACTICE OF COPYRIGHT LAW 
This is the 31st Manges lecture, and I am honored to be the first private 
practitioner to deliver it.  Copyright law is rich in its constitutional and legislative 
heritage, in its doctrinal underpinnings, and in its interplay with other important legal 
and social regimes and norms. 
 
 7. Thomas served as President, Chief Executive, and Chairman of Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.  
See William Grimes, Brooks Thomas, Publishing Executive at Harper & Row, Dies at 78, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 10, 2010), https://perma.cc/2X62-U22Q.  He also served as Chairman of the Board of the 
Association of American Publishers (“AAP”), and as Chair of its Freedom to Read Committee.  
 8. McCormack is the former Chairman, Chief Executive and Editorial Director of St. Martin’s 
Press.  See Mervyn Rothstein, From Playwright to Publishing Company Chief, Then Back Again, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 28, 2002), https://perma.cc/8QZG-PKFR. 
 9. Schulte was for many years the Executive Vice President at Random House and Alfred A. 
Knopf.  See Paul Vitello, Anthony Schulte, Publisher and Early Audiobook Proponent, Dies at 82, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 24, 2012), https://perma.cc/TZ52-J6RM.  He also served as Chair of the AAP’s Freedom to 
Read Committee. 
 10. Prashker was Vice President and Editor in Chief of Crown Publishing Group, and also served 
as Chair of the AAP’s Freedom to Read Committee.  See Edwin McDowell, The Media Business; Random 
House Names Publisher of Crown, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 1990), https://perma.cc/35TS-MZBW.  She too 
served as Chair of the AAP’s Freedom to Read Committee. 
 11. Bessie helped found Atheneum Publishers, serving as president from 1963 to 1975, and served 
as Senior Editor at Harper & Row.  See Christopher Lehmann-Haupt, Simon Michael Bessie, a Publisher 
of Major Literary Figures, Dies at 92, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2008), https://perma.cc/7USX-VRRR.  He 
also served as Chair of the AAP’s Freedom to Read Committee. 
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This complex heritage has been honored—and its contours provocatively 
discussed—by prior Manges lecturers spanning the federal judiciary, members of 
Congress, three Registers of Copyright, numerous scholars in the field—including 
Bob Gorman, and international copyright experts, among others.  
An important dimension of this copyright matrix not yet explored in this setting 
is the central role practicing attorneys have played in the continuing evolution of 
copyright law.   
Whereas the pace of legislative change in copyright law is glacial, its evolution 
via court decision and evolving commercial practice is continual.  And it is the 
practicing bar: who are confronted with myriad real world, time sensitive 
applications of this body of law; who create the factual records and who brief and 
argue the legal issues that undergird judicial decisions in the field; who negotiate 
complex license agreements in reliance on understandings of copyright law with 
broad consequences for the dissemination of works of creative expression; and who, 
like Horace Manges, represent the spectrum of affected parties and industries in the 
halls of Congress, before the Copyright Office, Justice Department, Office of the 
Solicitor General, and other relevant federal agencies on all matters relating to 
copyright.   
Not limited to copyright, those of us in private practice tend to take our cases—
and usually our clients—as we find them.  In my own experience, applied to the 
copyright sphere, this intellectual flexibility has had enormous advantages.  I say this 
because, to be effective counselors and advocates, copyright practitioners need fully 
to appreciate the balancing act that is copyright law.  
It is a truism that copyright serves the twin purposes of stimulating creative 
expression while enabling the public to benefit from the widest possible 
dissemination of information.12  But application of that balancing in the real world 
tends to be messy.  Important cases rarely lend themselves to a cut-and-dried legal 
analysis.  
For those of us who litigate, the ability to assist the court in distilling the critical 
issues; to explain how and why the desired result comports with norms of copyright 
law; and to fashion tailored relief all are maximized with the benefit of the rounded 
experience provided by exposure as a counselor and advocate to the range of 
legitimate copyright perspectives. 
 
 12. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) 
(“[Congress’s power to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts] is intended to motivate the 
creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public 
access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.”); Twentieth 
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The limited scope of the copyright holder’s 
statutory monopoly, like the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of 
competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private 
motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting the broad public availability of literature, music, 
and the other arts.”); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the 
clause empowering  Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of 
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors 
and inventors . . . .”). 
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In my own career, these needed skills have been tested in a series of remarkably 
interesting assignments, often involving issues of first impression with important 
consequences for the immediate parties as well as for a broad array of rights owners, 
users of copyrighted materials, and intermediaries who facilitate commerce in 
copyrighted works. 
Often, these disputes implicate a pre-Internet age statute in tension with the 
imperatives of ever-more-complex technology.  As I will further discuss, those 
imperatives are not to be underestimated. 
The challenging issues my colleagues and I have taken on over the years include:   
—Protecting book publishers and their authors from having their intellectual 
property diminished in value as a result of digital exploitation.  I have in mind here 
the two eBooks cases we litigated on behalf of Random House and HarperCollins,13 
as well as the ongoing Georgia State “e-reserves” litigation;14  
—Helping the Copyright Clearance Center build, at the invitation of Congress,15 
a vibrant, market accepting clearinghouse to meet the needs of copyright owners and 
users alike. This innovative intermediary enables the lawful photocopying and now 
digital reproduction of excerpts from scientific, technical, and medical journals and 
myriad other works; 
—Representing the First Amendment arm of the AAP in negotiations with its then 
copyright counsel, Jon Baumgarten, over an amicus brief seeking to strike the 
appropriate fair use balance in the seminal U.S. Supreme Court case, Harper & Row 
Publishers v. Nation Enterprises;16 
—Navigating the treacherous shoals of the fair use doctrine in countless other 
settings—old media and new—on behalf of copyright owners and users alike; 
—Protecting Bertelsmann, a good-faith lender, to Napster, a troubled Internet 
startup, from becoming ensnared in multibillion dollar infringement exposure as an 
alleged contributory infringer;17 
 
 13. Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(denying plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent defendant from selling eight specific 
works in e-book format), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002); HarperCollins Publishers, Inc. v. Open Road 
Integrated Media, LLP, 7 F. Supp. 3d 363, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding that plaintiff’s contractual right 
to publish a work in “book form” included the exclusive right to license e-book publication). 
 14. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 2012), vacated sub nom; 
Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014), remanded to Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, No. 
1:08-CV-1425-ODE, 2016 WL 3098397 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2016), aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. 
Cambridge Univ. Press v. Albert, 906 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2018).  For further discussion on the Georgia 
State “e-reserves” litigation, see Part V, infra.  
 15. See S. REP. NO. 94–473 (1975). 
 16. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1984); Brief for Association 
of American Publishers, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539 (1984) 
(No. 83-7277). 
 17. See Complaint, Capitol Records v. Bertelsmann AG, No. 1:03-cv-04074 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 
2003); Complaint, UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Bertelsmann AG, No. 1:03-cv-03338 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 
2003); Amended Complaint, Leiber v. Bertelsmann AG, No. 1:03-cv-01903 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2003).  
All three cases were eventually settled prior to any merits determinations. 
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—Helping shape the contours of secondary copyright liability as applied to e-
commerce marketplaces like eBay that do not themselves sell, possess, inspect, or—
absent notice from copyright or trademark owners—have knowledge of the bona 
fides of the items listed for sale on their sites;18 
—Working in the intersection of copyright and antitrust law to ensure that music 
license collectives such as ASCAP and BMI do not over-exercise their considerable 
market power.19 
These and other engagements have taught me that practicing copyright is more art 
than science.  While there is an immutable core of copyright precepts that help guide 
counseling and shape litigation outcomes, the kinds of issues we have confronted 
have invariably presented zones of grey that can make predicting outcomes 
hazardous.  
One learns from experience—as we did in the Barclays Capital v. 
Theflyonthewall.com litigation20—that even highly intelligent judges can reach 
dramatically different conclusions on controversial issues of copyright law.  In that 
case, at issue was the intersection of copyright preemption and the “hot news” 
misappropriation tort in the digital age. 
That has been both the challenge and the thrill of practicing in this field:  the 
opportunity to face new, and sometimes novel, issues implicating important lines of 
commerce; the need for creativity in our approaches to resolving them; and the ability 
to shape the future direction of copyright law in the process.  
For those law students attending who are considering practicing copyright law, I 
cannot think of a more exciting or dynamic area of the law.  These very uncertainties; 
the room for creative lawyering; and the opportunity to grapple with how new 
technologies and myriad new ways of harvesting, disseminating, and ingesting 
content that affect all of our lives intersect with the norms of copyright law, can offer 
a rich and rewarding professional experience. 
I do suggest, however—especially if you are contemplating litigating in the 
field—that you develop a cast iron stomach! 
I must add that I have been fortunate to have beside me throughout a brilliant and 
dedicated team of lawyers who understand the law as well as I do, and certainly the 
technology involved far better than I.  Fortunately, as well, they have exercised the 
sound judgment to pull me back from many an analytical abyss into which I would 
otherwise have fallen without their clearheaded thinking.  
 
 18. See, e.g., Rosen v. eBay, Inc., No. CV 13-6801, 2015 WL 1600081 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2015); 
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 600 F.3d 
93 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 19. See, e.g., United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 275 F.3d 168 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 782 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d per curiam 956 
F.2d. 21 (2d Cir. 1992); Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers v. Showtime/The Movie 
Channel, Inc., 912 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 20. Barclays Capital, Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d in 
part sub nom. Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011). 
RICH, THE ‘ART’ OF COPYRIGHT:  A PRACTITIONER’S PERSPECTIVE, 42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 189 (2019)  
2019] THE ‘ART’ OF COPYRIGHT:  A PRACTITIONER’S PERSPECTIVE 195 
 
 
III. COPYRIGHT AND COLLECTIVE LICENSING ARRANGEMENTS 
Effectively practicing copyright law entails understanding not only the various 
policy interests that undergird it.  It also requires sensitivity to the interests sought to 
be served by other important bodies of law, notably among them, antitrust law.  
Nowhere is this better exhibited, in my experience, than in connection with collective 
copyright licensing arrangements.  
As a society, we value not only the fruits of intellectual creation, but the norms of 
competition as well.  While copyright confers a degree of market power on each 
copyright owner in controlling commercialization of his work, antitrust law plays an 
important role in examining the pro versus anticompetitive effects of arrangements 
implicating multiple copyright owners acting collaboratively in licensing their 
rights.21 
Little did I know in my early practice years that I would become an expert in this 
intersection of copyright and antitrust, let alone in distinctly diverse settings.  One 
area of representation is an array of media clients in their dealings with the major 
music performing rights organizations, ASCAP and BMI the largest among them.  A 
second is our work with the Copyright Clearance Center in its unique role 
representing the interests of rights holders and users alike in developing licensing 
solutions enabling the lawful reproduction and other reuses of copyrighted textual 
and other works. 
 Both settings involve collective licensing arrangements.  In ASCAP’s and BMI’s 
case, blanket, repertory wide licenses to the millions of musical works owned by 
affiliated composers and music publishers enable licensees to publicly perform those 
works at prices set by the PRO.  With regard to CCC, repertory licenses to the works 
of thousands of publishers of scientific, technical, and medical journals along with 
myriad other publications permit corporate, academic, and other users to reproduce 
portions of those works for prescribed purposes at license prices set by CCC. 
The inherent market power possessed by ASCAP and BMI in licensing millions 
of copyrighted compositions and the potential for its abuse have long been 
recognized.  This concern is exemplified by a long history of government, and later 
private, antitrust litigation, and by the government fashioned antitrust consent 
decrees that regulate significant aspects of their business to this day.22 
 
 21. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1979) (finding 
that blanket licensing agreements of ASCAP and BMI were not per se violations of the Sherman Act, but 
“should be subjected to a more discriminating examination under the rule of reason.”); Meredith Corp. v. 
SESAC LLC, 1 F. Supp. 3d 180 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 22. The Government commenced antitrust litigation against ASCAP and BMI in their early years 
over concerns about the potential anticompetitive effects of their collective licensing arrangements.  See 
United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors, & Publishers, 1941 Trade Cas. (CCH) P56,104 
(S.D.N.Y. 1941); United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 1940-43 Trade Cas. CCH P56,096, 381 (E.D. Wisc. 
1941).  The lawsuits were settled in favor of ASCAP and BMI entering into antitrust consent decrees 
which have been periodically amended over the years.  See, e.g., United States v. Am. Soc’y of 
Composers, Authors & Publishers, No. 41-1395, 2001 WL 1589999 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2001); United 
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In its earliest applications, the PRO blanket license enabled licensing markets to 
operate efficiently by providing licenses covering spontaneous public performances 
of the licensed music to individual copyright owners who could not feasibly monitor 
this usage.  As colorfully described by the Supreme Court in BMI v. CBS, these were 
performances of a type involving “the disk-jockey’s itchy fingers and the 
bandleader’s restive baton.”23 
But what are the competitive virtues of such collective licensing where, instead 
of enabling copyright compliant markets, the blanket license may be seen as 
impeding competition on price that could and would occur between and among 
individual rights owners to have their works performed?  One example is found in 
the licensing of the music incorporated in pre-recorded television programming, 
where program producers could, at the time of program creation and music 
selection—but generally do not—invoke such a competitive licensing process.  
Downstream broadcasters have been left instead with the obligation to obtain blanket 
licenses in order to air these programs at a time and in a posture where they have no 
practical alternative. 
On behalf of an array of media clients, we have been vigorous advocates for 
limiting the potential anticompetitive effects of PRO blanket licenses in these and 
similar circumstances.24  My friends on the other side of this debate—including a 
number in the room tonight—ably represent the PRO perspective in such matters.  
As advocates, we regularly disagree, but we manage to do so agreeably. 
Together with the more recent sound recording performance rights landscape, it 
is a fascinating area of copyright law with interesting chapters yet to be written.25  
The field poses constant challenges for practitioners in the face of new technology, 
new platforms for music distribution, new PRO entrants, and competing rights 
claimants for what is a limited royalty pool. 
Then there are CCC’s circumstances.  
CCC can legitimately claim to have sprung from Congress’ bosom.  The Senate 
report accompanying the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act recommended 
formation of a neutral clearinghouse to address the nettlesome issues posed by 
photocopying technology.26  In its first—and to date only—foray into the topic, the 
 
States v. Broad. Music, Inc., No. 64-3787, 1994 WL 901652 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1994).  A series of private 
antitrust suits have been generally resolved in ASCAP’s and BMI’s favor—at least in part based on the 
regulatory influence of these consent decrees.  See Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. at 13; Buffalo Broad. 
Co. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 744 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1984). But see, Meredith, 
1 F. Supp. 3d at 185. 
 23. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. at 22 n.37 (quoting Sigmund Timberg, The Antitrust Aspects 
of Merchandising Modern Music:  The ASCAP Consent Judgment of 1950, 19 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
294, 297 (1954)). 
 24. See, e.g., Broad. Music., Inc., 275 F.3d at 168; Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 
782 F. Supp. at 778; Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 912 F.2d at 563. 
 25. See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 
336 (1995) (amending §106 and §114 to title 17, United States Code, to provide an exclusive right to 
perform sound recordings publicly by means of digital transmissions).  A series of rate-setting proceedings 
for webcasters and satellite radio providers, among others, have ensued under this legislation in which 
Weil has been active. 
 26. See S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 82 (1975). 
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Supreme Court had, in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, split down the 
middle—4 to 4 with Justice Blackmun not participating—on the fair use issues posed 
by unlicensed photocopying undertaken by the National Institutes of Health and 
National Library of Medicine.27 
CCC was organized out of a collaboration of authors, publishers, and users to 
mitigate the foreseeable ongoing legal tensions surrounding the lawful bounds of 
unlicensed photocopying.  The hope was that CCC, working collaboratively with 
these communities of interest, would bring to the market workable solutions:  
copyright licenses acceptable to rights owners and users alike that would avoid costly 
and industry disruptive infringement litigation testing fair use boundary lines.  
CCC opened its doors in 1978, the effective date of the 1976 Act.  I began 
counseling the organization in 1980. 
In its early years, CCC struggled to implement a license mechanism that, in 
combination, enabled large corporate users to comply with copyright law, that 
allowed publishers (mainly of STM journals) to set the photocopy fees they sought, 
that did not cumulatively generate what large users might consider prohibitively high 
royalties, and that was administratively feasible for all concerned. 
It proved to be quite a task.  CCC began by offering transactional licenses under 
an “honor system” that entailed users voluntarily tendering payments to CCC on a 
publisher prescribed, cents-per-copy basis at rates displayed on the cover pages of 
participating journals.  The costs of operating such a system, together with the modest 
royalties generated, nearly doomed the organization.   
After experimenting with other license formats, and after obtaining buy-in from 
key rights owners, CCC decided to develop a repertory license the pricing of which 
would be set by CCC itself, reflecting its best judgment as to the fair-market value 
of the bundle of rights conveyed. 
The antitrust history surrounding the music performing rights organizations 
provided a critically important backdrop to development of this new license.  To 
minimize risks, our firm sought a business review clearance from the Justice 
Department’s Antitrust Division.  As it turns out, the matter landed on the desk of 
the same division staffers who were considering competitive issues presented by the 
music PROs.  I believe expressly to torture me, the government staffer leading the 
review asked that we provide the government with an explanation as to how and why 
the proposed CCC license did not raise similar antitrust concerns as were posed by 
the ASCAP and BMI arrangements under review. 
Our response included that a CCC repertory license was desired by rights holders 
and major corporate users alike; that it was transactionally more efficient than the 
license mechanisms that preceded it; that it was likely to generate lower cumulative 
fees than the license formats that preceded it; and that CCC as non-exclusive 
licensing intermediary would both preserve the ability of users to contract with 
individual rights holders and would itself maintain alternative licenses conveying 
 
 27. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). 
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rights at prices set by those rights holders, such that no user would feel obligated to 
take a repertory license.  
The explanations we provided proved satisfactory.  The government issued the 
requested business review clearance.28  This breakthrough ushered in an era of 
tremendous growth and overall success for CCC, which continues to this day.  
In our music license representations, our firm has been criticized for advocating 
positions that are “anti-copyright,” on the apparent premise that copyright exists 
primarily to protect the interests of rights holders.  Conversely, our forceful advocacy 
on behalf of book and journal publishers to prevent over-extension of the fair use 
doctrine has been criticized as overweighting the interests of rights owners.  Most 
recently, in the Georgia State University litigation,29 this criticism posited that the 
very ability of institutions of higher education to fulfill their pedagogical missions 
would be impaired by a ruling that affording entire classes of students digital copies 
comprising significant takings of works of scholarship exceeds fair use boundaries.   
My perspective is different, and is grounded in two basic considerations.  First is 
the need for nuanced application of copyright law, attuned to particular fact and 
market settings. The right copyright outcome does not always fall on the same side 
of the rights owner/user divide. Second, illustrated by my experience with the 
Department of Justice, is the need for doctrinal consistency across one’s advocacy.  
In articulating positions before courts and government agencies, there is nothing 
more embarrassing or disserving of one’s clients than to have your prior, inconsistent 
advocacy on behalf of another client quoted back.  The art of practicing copyright 
law requires avoiding those “gotcha” moments. 
IV. COPYRIGHT AND ADVANCING TECHNOLOGY 
As copyright practitioners, we are challenged as never before to sort out the 
correct answer today, as the law stands, from what one may conceive to be the 
normatively correct one.  The pace of technological change has tested the bar’s and 
the judiciary’s ability to maintain that distinction, as more and more copyright issues 
arise in circumstances not—certainly expressly—contemplated by a statute many of 
whose foundational elements date back to 1976 and antecedent decades of legislative 
gestation. 
The process of distilling down the salient issues, whether for purposes of 
rendering advice or for preparing and litigating cases, has become an increasingly 
complicated one, principally because of the architecture of digital technology.  We 
find ourselves working more and more, not simply with the client’s lawyers and 
business people, but as well with their IT and engineering teams, to understand the 
technology that will have important, if not dispositive, impact in reaching the correct 
copyright law answers. 
To be clear, when I use the word “correct,” I mean faithful to copyright law as it 
is written today.  That can be different from one’s views as to what the answer should 
 
 28. Letter from Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, to author (Aug. 
2, 1993) (on file with author). 
 29. See Part V, infra.  
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be viewing copyright principles through a broader policy lens or by presuming what 
Congress would have intended had the facts and technology at hand been before them 
at the time the law was written.  
This tension has spawned much debate as to how capable our current copyright 
law is in providing sound answers to issues including: which aspects of digitally 
disseminated content implicate one or more of Section 106’s exclusive rights of 
reproduction, distribution, public display, and public performance; the application of 
the first sale doctrine to electronic dispositions of used copyrighted works; and the 
proper conception of—and interplay between—fair use factor one’s “transformative 
use” and factor four’s market harm tests. 
While it is fascinating to follow the debate as to which aspects of the law as written 
require amendment—and I dutifully reference Maria Pallante’s 2013 Manges lecture 
entitled “The Next Great Copyright Act”—for those of us handling truly novel 
applications of copyright law to given sets of facts, the debate is generally 
unhelpful.30  We are faced with providing advice and developing litigation records 
in real time and with the necessity of arguing how existing copyright law supports 
our clients’ positions.  
How do these issues come up in real world applications? 
Take the example of streamed content by a digital audio music service to end 
users who, let us stipulate, have no ability to download and store copies of the 
musical works or sound recordings—just the ability to listen in real time.  Is the 
music service streaming such content liable solely for the public performances of the 
music that admittedly occur when users listen to its content?  Or, do the acts of 
incidental, internal copying in the nature of buffering that accompany and 
technologically enable these streams potentially give rise to separate and additional 
liability? 
Assuming one is able to identify instances of copying in relation to such 
transmissions, for how long must that copy be maintained for it to satisfy the Act’s 
fixation requirement?  Namely, when is its embodiment in a tangible medium of 
expression, in the words of the statute, “sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it 
to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than 
transitory duration[?]”31 
Where any acts of otherwise actionable copying may be identified in the 
streaming setting, is there a fair use defense to liability for such copying?  The 
equitable basis for such argument is that there is no separate economic value attached 
solely to such incidental copying, which is merely a technological artifact of 
streaming—that, generally, the same copyright owners who would receive royalties 
 
 30. Maria Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315 (2013).  
 31. 17 U.S.C. § 101.  See, e.g., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 
F. Supp. 2d 607, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding temporary buffer copies to be “fixed”), rev’d in part sub 
nom. Cartoon Network, LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 129 (2d Cir. 2008) (concluding that 
temporary buffer copies are not fixed because no data remains in the buffer for more than 1.2 seconds), 
cert. denied, 557 U.S. 946 (2009). 
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from such reproductions would already be entitled to receive public performance 
income from the streaming activity.32 
A recent interesting twist on these issues was presented in litigation over the 
licensing of performances in pre-1972 sound recordings.  We represented both Sirius 
XM, for a time, and Pandora Media in that series of lawsuits, several of which are 
still ongoing.33   
The primary issue posed is whether there exists under various state laws, including 
in New York, California, and Florida, a right of public performance in sound 
recordings made prior to February 15, 1972, the date as of which federal copyright 
protection for sound recordings began.  
These lawsuits also, however, have asserted common law claims of unlawful 
copying accompanying the streaming and satellite transmissions of such sound 
recordings. 
The record industry has not fared well in these cases.  Both the New York Court 
of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Florida have ruled that no such public 
performance right exists in their state.34  California, which implicates a statute that 
might call for a different result, has yet to weigh in at the appellate level.35   
Of note for the present discussion, the Second Circuit, to which the case returned 
following the New York Court of Appeals’ determination that no pre-1972 public 
performance right exists under New York law, dismissed the ancillary copying claim, 
effectively on fair use grounds.36  It held that the state’s highest court’s determination 
“whether the ultimate use of the internal copies is permissible” was “determinative” 
of the copying claims as well.37  The Florida Supreme Court, citing the Second 
Circuit, agreed.38 
These rulings are commonsensical.  To have ruled otherwise would have had the 
effect of permitting the plaintiffs to circumvent the conclusion that there exists no 
compensable performance right by conditioning such performances on payment of 
the demanded fees for the attendant incidental copying of the works involved.39  
Then there has been posed the converse issue:  does a download of copyrighted 
content, say, a music file, implicate not merely the reproduction, but also a public 
performance of the underlying work?  ASCAP so argued in litigation over the rates 
 
 32. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT, at 144–46 (2001). 
 33. See Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. 13-5693 PSG, 2014 WL 4725382 (C.D. 
Cal. Sept. 22, 2014), appeal docketed, No. 17-55844 (9th Cir. June 15, 2017). 
 34. See Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 229 So.3d 305 (Fla. 2017); Flo & Eddie, Inc. 
v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 70 N.E.3d 936 (N.Y. 2016). 
 35. See Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. 13-5693 PSG, 2014 WL 4725382 (C.D. 
Cal. Sept. 22, 2014), appeal docketed, No. 17-55844 (9th Cir. June 15, 2017). 
 36. Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 849 F.3d 14, 16 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 37. Id. (emphasis added). 
 38. Flo & Eddie, Inc., 229 So.3d at 320. 
 39. Subsequent to this lecture, as part of the Musical Modernization Act (the “MMA”), enacted 
October 11, 2018, Congress addressed the licensing of pre-1972 sound recordings.  See Pub. L. No. 115–
264, §202(a)(1).  Title II of the MMA extends copyright protection to pre-1972 sounds recordings on 
essentially the same terms as post-1972 sound recordings, preempting state and common law claims. Id. 
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it could charge certain online services for their public performances of music.  Our 
firm represented the affected music services.40 
At first, and I would argue even at second, blush, the answer would seem to be 
no.  Section 101 of the Act prescribes that to perform a work is to recite, render, play, 
dance, or act it—strongly intimating the ability of a listener to experience a 
performance of the work in real time—to perceive it contemporaneously.  This is not 
the case with a traditional download, where no such contemporaneous rendering of 
the work takes place. 
ASCAP pointed to language in the Act’s definition of what constitutes a public 
performance—“to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance . . . of the 
work”—as support for its position.41  Its argument was that downloads constitute 
transmissions of works embodying performances of music. 
The affected services, supported by amici from the digital music, motion picture, 
and entertainment software industries, countered that adoption of ASCAP’s position 
improperly would entitle music publishers to two bites of the same economic apple:  
the first, by deriving synchronization and mechanical royalties from downloads of 
their works; the second, as their distributive share of ASCAP proceeds from any 
public performances deemed to have taken place during those same downloads. 
The Second Circuit concluded that the downloads implicated do not involve 
public performances of the embedded copyrighted content.  It found, first, that a 
statutory definition of what constitutes a “public” performance does not answer the 
threshold issue of what constitutes a performance in the first place; and second, that 
a transmittal of a work embodying a performance is not equivalent to a 
contemporaneous performance of the work itself, as the statutory language 
anticipates.42 
While I am a strong proponent of crafting arguments that comport with the 
dictates of common sense, that norm does not always prove consonant with copyright 
outcomes.  A series of recent decisions demonstrates the complexity of harmonizing 
the wording of statutory text and the workings of new technology with intuitively 
logical outcomes.   
A great example is Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc.—a case that captures the 
fancy of every class I teach.43  When I buy a CD—or used to—the first sale doctrine 
permits me to relinquish possession of it and transfer ownership to whomever I please 
with no obligation to the owner of the sound recording.  But what if I join an e-music 
club that allows me to upload that CD to the e-music club’s server, then sell it to 
other club members via digital transfer?  Is that transaction similarly protected by the 
first sale doctrine? 
 
 40. United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 559 F. Supp. 2d 332 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in part, vacated and remanded in part, 627 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 41. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-281).  
 42. United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 627 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 43. Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 910 F.3d 
649 (2d Cir. 2018).  
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Under the rationale of Judge Sullivan’s S.D.N.Y. ReDigi decision, the answer is 
likely no.  At the outset, the court described the lawsuit as one against a “twenty-first 
century technology company” implicating “a fundamental clash over culture, policy, 
and copyright law.”44  The issue posed was whether transactions enabled by an 
Internet service that allowed users to sell legally acquired digital music files to other 
subscribers—in the process, relinquishing possession of the seller’s own music file—
were protected by the first sale doctrine as codified in Section 109 of the Act.  
Plaintiff Capitol Records argued instead that such transactions implicated the making 
of additional copies of its sound recordings and hence infringed upon its copyright 
rights.   
Reflecting the high level of interest in the case and the larger policy debate 
surrounding digital resales of copyrighted works, the district court pointedly 
observed, “because this is a court of law and not a congressional subcommittee or 
technology blog, the issues are narrow, technical and purely legal.”45 
Judge Sullivan’s analysis was purely technical to a fault. 
The court concluded that the process by which a music file was transferred from 
seller to buyer under ReDigi’s system distinguished such a transaction from the sale 
of a book or CD.46  This was so, the court found, because a music file transfer via 
ReDigi’s platform did not simply involve the physical transfer of a material object 
containing the copyrighted work.  Rather, it involved two reproductions:  first, a 
seller was required to upload its music file onto ReDigi’s server, an act of copying; 
and second, the purchaser downloaded the file to her own computer—also an act of 
copying.   
To the court it mattered not that, in the end, only one material object embodying 
the musical work was to remain accessible.  The first sale doctrine was held not to 
protect such transactions for three reasons:  first, Section 109 does not protect 
reproductions, only distributions, of works;47 second, the copy transferred (the 
reproduction contained on ReDigi’s server) was not lawfully made;48 and finally, the 
seller’s own copy was not the one being distributed.49 
The court rebuffed ReDigi’s and supporting amici’s arguments that the advent of 
technology had made application of the first sale doctrine ambiguous, and that 
important policy interests supported permitting the challenged activity.  Whatever 
the strength of those policy arguments, the court responded, the language of the 
statutory provisions was not ambiguous; courts are ill-suited to resolve policy 
debates of this sort; and it was for Congress to ordain a different result.50  
The case was argued on appeal to the Second Circuit during the summer of 2017. 
A review of the briefing and extensive oral argument serves to underscore the 
technologically complex facts involved—including disputes over exactly how the 
 
 44. Id. at 645. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 657. 
 47. Id. at 648. 
 48. Id.  
 49. Id. at 649–50. 
 50. Id. at 655.   
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digital music files were transferred and whether digital music files themselves 
constitute material objects within the meaning of the Act.  
The import of the case appears not to be lost on the Second Circuit panel, which 
included inaugural Manges lecturer Jon Newman51 as well as Pierre Leval.52  The 
panel signaled their view that this one may be headed for Supreme Court review.53  
The chambers of one of Judge Sullivan’s colleagues, Judge Forrest, recently 
produced a copyright decision that delights my friend Ken Norwick, in attendance 
here, and that, to my reading, resolves this difficult balancing between a faithful-to-
statutory-text analysis versus what the court may nonetheless perceive to be a result 
consonant with the purposes of the Copyright Act in a different manner.   
Goldman v. Breitbart News involved a test of the application of the public display 
right to “embedded”—that is, in-line linked—images.54  Specifically at issue was the 
liability of news organizations for embedding onto their websites a copyrighted 
photo of sports star Tom Brady that had gone viral on the internet.  The process of 
embedding did not involve any acts of downloading, copying, or storage of the photo 
on the part of the defendants.  Instead, it involved coding their websites so as to direct 
the user’s browser to a third-party server—here, Twitter—to retrieve the image and 
make it visible in full size, without the need to click on a hyperlink or a thumbnail. 
In her own telling opening, Judge Forrest wrote:  
When the Copyright Act was amended in 1976, the words ‘tweet,’ ‘viral,’ and ‘embed’ 
invoked thoughts of a bird, a disease, and a reporter.  Decades later, these same terms 
have taken on new meanings as the centerpiece of an interconnected world wide web 
in which images are shared with dizzying speed over the course of any given news 
day.55 
In a controversial opinion, the court went on to rule that the defendant news 
organizations’ embedding of the Brady photo did constitute a public display within 
the meaning of Section 106(5) of the Act.  In so holding, the court rejected 
application of the so-called server test, most prominently adopted by the Ninth 
Circuit, which would have called for the opposite conclusion.56   
The server test looks to where the image is stored and from where it is served—
here, Twitter.  Drawing support from the Act’s definitions of the terms “display” and 
 
 51. Hon. Jon Newman delivered the first Manges Lecture in 1988.  The Annual Horace S. Manges 
Lecture, supra note 1. 
 52. Hon. Pierre Leval delivered the 16th Manges Lecture in 2003. Id.  
 53. Oral Argument at 9:40, Capitol Records v. ReDigi Inc., 910 F.3d 649 (2d. Cir. 2018) (No. 16-
2321), https://www.courtlistener.com/audio/31413/capitol-records-llc-v-redigi/.  The Second Circuit has 
since handed down its opinion, affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Capitol 
Records and holding that ReDigi infringed on Capitol Records’ exclusive rights to reproduce copyrighted 
works.  Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 910 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2018).  
 54. Goldman v. Breitbart News Network, LLC, 302 F. Supp. 3d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 55. Id. at 585–86. 
 56. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1159 (9th Cir. 2007).  
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“copy,” the server test absolves from liability under Section 106(5) web sites to 
which the image is communicated but which do not themselves store it.  
Concluding that “the physical location and/or possession” of an image does not 
determine who has displayed it within the meaning of the Act, the court in Goldman 
found that where, as here, the defendants had taken active steps to put in place a 
process that deliberately enabled the image to be visibly shown, they had engaged in 
a public display of that image. 
Despite professing to find support for its conclusion in the actual statutory text, 
betraying some doubt on that score is the support for its reasoning the court derived 
from the Supreme Court’s 2014 American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, 
Inc. decision.57  It cited approvingly what it characterized as that Court’s refusal to 
absolve Aereo from public performance liability “based upon purely technical 
distinctions.”58  In Aereo, the Supreme Court found that certain technical details of 
Aereo’s operations invisible—and of no meaning—to broadcasters and subscribers 
did not save Aereo from copyright liability.  So, too, per the district court in 
Goldman, “mere technical distinctions invisible to the user should not be the 
lynchpin on which copyright liability lies.”59 
What would Judge Sullivan say to that?  Was ReDigi’s architecture not equally 
invisible to users?  Are the two approaches reconcilable? 
Judge Forrest turned to the ‘76 Act’s legislative history for her capacious reading 
of the reach of the display right, citing language from the House Report stating that 
Congress did “not intend to freeze the scope of copyrightable subject matter at the 
present stage of communications technology.”60   
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Aereo, in contrast, argued that “the proper 
course is not to bend and twist the Act’s terms in an effort to produce a just outcome, 
but to apply the law as it stands and leave to Congress the task of deciding whether 
the Copyright Act needs an upgrade.”61  He drew support from the court’s earlier 
Sony decision, which opined that “it may well be that Congress will take a fresh look 
at this new technology, just as it so often has examined other innovations in the past.  
But it is not our job to apply laws that have not yet been written.”62 
Who is right? What guidance does this provide us as practitioners? Does a 
consistent application of copyright law provide two distinct paths for copyright 
owners to successfully prosecute new technology infringement claims? One 
approach, as in ReDigi, and as would appear to find support in Justice Thomas’ 
opinion for the court in Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc.63 asserts the 
importance of a strict parsing of the legislative text, irrespective of potentially 
anomalous results.  The other approach, as could be said to be manifested in Goldman 
and Aereo, prioritizes avoiding the potential harm to copyright owners occasioned 
 
 57. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2500 (2014). 
 58. Goldman, 302 F. Supp. at 594. 
 59. Id. at 595. 
 60. Id. at 589 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 47, 51 (1976)). 
 61. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2518 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 62. Id. (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984)). 
 63. Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1005 (2017). 
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by permitting the invisible workings of technology or clever technology work-
arounds, however defensible on the face of the statute, to stand in the way of the 
seemingly right copyright result.  
When Judge Forrest certified her ruling to the Second Circuit, she highlighted the 
“knotty legal problem” presented as well as the “tremendous uncertainty” it has 
created for online publishers.64  
V. FAIR USE IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
Speaking of mixed judicial messages, a few observations about the fair use cases 
that continue to arise in technology-enabled settings.   
I was schooled in the traditional conception of fair use as a limited exception to 
the exclusive rights of copyright owners to control the exploitations of their works—
a doctrine prototypically invoked in instances where the user borrowed a limited 
amount of an author’s expression and made productive use of it by adding creative 
expression of her own for purposes of comment, criticism, news reporting, parody, 
or the like.  Uses that added nothing to the original expression—that merely slavishly 
copied it—generally were regarded as falling outside of fair use parameters.65 
Underlying this fair use fault line was the general conception that productive uses 
of the type envisioned were not only socially beneficial, but, as a general matter, 
were unlikely to interfere in the borrowed-from author’s exploitation of his work, as 
they would not satisfy the demand for the original.  Conversely, takings that did no 
more than “supersede the originals” were understood to risk market impairment to 
an unacceptable degree.66 
This understanding was articulated in the Supreme Court’s 1994 Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. decision.  There, the Court, borrowing from prior Manges 
lecturer Pierre Leval’s seminal Harvard Law Review article,67 characterized 
quintessential fair uses as those that “add something new, with a further purpose or 
different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning or message; the 
inquiry asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is 
‘transformative.’”68 
In the years that have followed, as Jane Ginsburg and others have observed, the 
defendant who has been able to demonstrate such a transformative use has virtually 
 
 64. Memorandum Decision & Order certifying the Court’s February 15, 2018 Opinion for 
Interlocutory Appeal, Goldman v. Breitbart News Network, LLC, No. 17-cv-3144 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 
2018).  The Second Circuit subsequently declined to accept the appeal at this interlocutory stage of 
litigation.  See No. 18-910 (2d Cir. July 17, 2018). 
 65. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 540–41 (1985); Am. 
Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 926 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 66. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (citing Folsom v. 
Marsh 9 F. Cas. 342 (no. 4,901) (CCD Mass. 1841)). 
 67. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990). 
 68. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
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always prevailed in her fair use defense.69  This should not be surprising to the extent 
that such a finding is grounded in uses “that add something new” to the original, 
imbuing it with “a further purpose or character.”  It logically follows that uses 
meeting those criteria are less likely to fulfill demand for the originals. 
Straightforward, right? 
No longer. 
Beginning with the Ninth Circuit’s 2002 opinion in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.,70 
conceptions of transformative use have dramatically evolved.  Without doubt, the 
impetus for this change has been the revolutionary opportunities the Internet and 
digital technology have presented to search for, retrieve, organize, and index vast 
quantities of text and images, and the perceived societal benefits flowing therefrom.   
Kelly v. Arriba Soft involved an Internet service provider (ISP) that crawled the 
web for images to index.  In terms of copyright interests, it downloaded (i.e., copied) 
these images and displayed them in thumbnail format to its subscribers. 
Tested against prevailing norms of transformative use, this ISP’s activities would 
seem not to have passed muster.  After all, they implicated exact, unaltered copying 
of entire originals of these images, modified only to the extent they were presented 
in a different medium. 
Breaking new ground, however, the Ninth Circuit held that the ISP’s uses of the 
images were transformative insofar as they served an entirely different function than 
the originals.  Whereas the plaintiff photographer’s images were “artistic works 
intended to inform and engage the viewer in an aesthetic experience,”71 the 
defendant’s use was unrelated to any aesthetic purpose and instead was part and 
parcel of a search engine’s function to act as “a tool to help index and improve access 
to images on the internet and their related web sites.”72  
Bookending this finding with its factor four market harm conclusion that Arriba 
Soft’s activities, if anything, served to draw business to the plaintiff by directing 
traffic to his website, the court held this web scraping activity to be a fair use. 
The Kelly decision was, at the time, viewed by many—myself included—as an 
outlier that threatened to rip the conception of transformative use from its moorings 
and open the door to a vast, potentially uncontainable, Internet-driven expansion of 
the reach of the fair use doctrine.   
Where, on the facts presented in Kelly, was the added authorial contribution in 
the nature of comment, criticism or the like?  What new expression, meaning or 
message had been added to the original by the defendant?  What were the logical 
limits to the court’s analysis? 
 
 69. Jane C. Ginsburg, Fair Use for Free, or Permitted-but-Paid?, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1383, 
1400 (2014). 
 70. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 71. Id. at 818. 
 72. Id. 
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The subsequent Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,73 and quite recent Authors 
Guild v. Google, Inc.74 and Authors Guild, Inc. v. Hathitrust75 decisions have 
extended the reach of the fair use doctrine to encompass a hitherto unimaginable 
scope of copying on similar analytic premises.  On reflection, I would suggest that 
what we are observing in relation to application of fair use principles in the internet 
setting is, perhaps, both more basic and less revolutionary than previously perceived.  
I also would suggest that the focus of concern for preserving a healthy copyright law 
balance going forward should be less on proper conceptions of transformative use 
than the all-important factor four showing of market harm. 
First, a fundamental aspect of what we have been observing is a reflection of the 
sheer power of technology.  In order for ISPs to enable virtually limitless, 
instantaneous access to information of broad social value, such entities need the 
ability to make internal copies of potentially vast quantities of copyrighted material.  
How realistic is it that a court will, a priori, condition such activity on pre-clearing 
the copyrights implicated? 
Indeed, I would note that in the recent Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc. 
case decided by the Second Circuit, Fox Broadcasting as the complaining copyright 
owner did not contest on appeal the defendant’s entitlement to make wall-to-wall 
internal copies of Fox broadcasts.77  It reserved its infringement arguments for the 
degree of access to its content that has been afforded TVEyes’ subscribers.   
How many copyright practitioners and scholars would, at the time the Google 
Books project launched, have conceded the propriety of the predicate to Google’s 
project:  the scanning millions of copyrighted works without permission in order to 
populate its search database?  How quickly significant aspects of the technology 
imperative are being taken as a given. 
The second observation I would make is that this evolved conception of 
transformative use remains but one—albeit important—element of the overall fair 
use analysis.  The other major consideration—factor four market harm—remains 
highly relevant, and I do not read the recent mega-fair use cases to suggest otherwise.  
The Second Circuit in TVEyes stated expressly that it is the most important aspect of 
the analysis, citing Harper & Row.78 
That said, what is happening, as is most apparent in the Second Circuit’s TVEyes 
opinion, is a de-linkage of the logical connectedness between what passes for 
transformative use and the prospect of market harm.  As observed, the types of 
commercial activity that increasingly are being labeled transformative are moving 
from criticism, parody, and other similar “new expression” added to the original to 
perceived socially productive uses to which otherwise unaltered copying may be put.   
 
 73. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 74. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 75. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Hathitrust, 755 F.3d 87, 87–88 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 77. Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. denied (No. 
18-321) (U.S. Dec. 3, 2018). 
 78. Id. at 176 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1984)). 
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That being the case, the previous close connection between transformative uses and 
an absence of likely market harm has become attenuated. 
The majority opinion in TVEyes vividly demonstrates the point.  The opinion can 
be seen—quite controversially—to push the boundaries of transformative use to its 
latest edge.  The court found the efficiencies afforded subscribers to the TVEyes 
service in accessing and viewing the TV programming recorded to be at least 
“somewhat transformative.”  At the same time, the majority proceeded to conclude 
that the challenged service was not protected as fair use, principally because Fox was 
able to demonstrate potential market harm to its own commercial offerings. 
It would thus appear, at least at this stage of case law development, that the 
expansion of the judicial conception of what constitutes transformative use and the 
decoupling of its logical connection to the extent of market harm actually serves to 
reinforce the preeminent importance of the factor four market harm analysis.    
This leads me to a criticism of the Google Books decision79¾written, notably, by 
Judge Leval.  As my colleague Jonathan Bloom and I wrote in an amicus brief to the 
Supreme Court supporting certiorari review of the Second Circuit decision, the 
circuit court found an absence of market harm arising out of the Google Books 
project insofar as there was no demonstrable prospect of lost book sales.80  But this 
reflected a blindered view of the market harm analysis, one that ignored completely 
the prospect of a derivative licensing market in which book publishers would license 
the right to integrate their works into informational databases.  It is, after all, their 
and their authors’ intellectual property that is the raw material of Google’s database.  
Every written word has been copied by Google into that database and is made 
available for public display.  Without that copyrighted content, there would be no 
database. 
In TVEyes, the Second Circuit recognized precisely such a prospect:  that Fox 
would have the commercial ability and incentive to license clips of its programming, 
just as TVEyes was itself doing without compensation to Fox. 
It seems no answer that the end product offered by a Google Books program—no 
different from TVEyes’ offering—is not one that any individual rights owner could 
replicate.  That factor should, perhaps, weigh in Google’s favor under evolving 
conceptions of transformative use.  But it ought not be viewed as dispositive of factor 
four market harm under a dated conception of such harm as limited to lost sales of 
the originals.   
The Supreme Court decisions in Campbell and Sony instruct that factor four 
potential market harm can be demonstrated in relation not only to lost sales, but also 
to likely impairment of licensing markets.  Book publishers, along with myriad other 
content owners, have been investing significantly in new forms of content 
distribution to keep abreast of technological developments.  Digital licensing is 
prominent among them.  
 
 79. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d at 203. 
 80. Brief for Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8, 
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1658 (2016). 
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To discount such investment as too new or uncertain of success, too insignificant 
in relation to overall sales, or as just plain irrelevant misapprehends a proper and 
robust market harm analysis.  In my estimation, such erroneous reasoning, as infected 
the Google Books decision as well as the district court’s latest ruling in the Georgia 
State case, which I next discuss, poses a greater risk to a balanced administration of 
copyright law than do growingly expansive notions of transformative use. 
The complexities of applying the fair use doctrine to copying activity enabled by 
digital technology are nowhere more vividly illustrated than in the Georgia State 
University litigation, which is perhaps the most challenging copyright lawsuit in 
which I have been engaged.81  We have been representing the book publishing 
industry in that litigation, which began in 2008 and continues to this day, following 
two trips to the 11th Circuit.  
The case presents the issue whether the fair use doctrine affords educational 
institutions protection from infringement liability when they copy in digital format, 
and distribute to entire classes of students, significant portions of the copyrighted 
works of academic publishers whose primary market consists of sales and the 
licensing of permissions to the academy.  
At its outset, I had not conceived of the litigation, for all of its importance, as 
presenting especially close issues.  The case did not involve any transformative uses 
of the copied materials.  They were purely substitutional for sales and licenses of the 
originals.  There was, in addition, precedent holding that such activity taking the 
form of physical course packs (albeit focused on the liability of the corner copy shop 
making the copies, rather than the university itself doing so) was not fair use.82  This 
case presented the digital era analogue. 
We also knew that, just as is the case with paper course packs, the Copyright 
Clearance Center offers reasonably priced, easy-to-administer licenses to enable “e-
reserves” use of the types of works implicated—indeed, as testified to at trial, for less 
than four dollars per student annually, Georgia State University (GSU) could have 
obtained a license to use more than a million works for e-reserves course readings.  
From discovery, there was further evidence, dating back to 2003, that GSU 
administrators had been urging professors to use their so-called e-reserves system as 
opposed to paper course packs for the explicit purpose of saving students money, and 
that GSU has budgeted no monies to cover permissions payments for such e-reserves 
uses. 
The case has proven to be anything but easy.  The federal district court in Atlanta 
has twice ruled mostly in favor of the defense, finding the paper course pack 
precedents of little relevance insofar as they implicated for-profit defendants, and 
 
 81. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 2012), vacated sub nom. 
Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014), remanded to Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, No. 
1:08-CV-1425-ODE, 2016 WL 3098397 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2016), aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. 
Cambridge Univ. Press v. Albert, 906 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 82. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en 
banc); Basic Books, Inc., v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
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weighing the not-for-profit educational mission of GSU extraordinarily heavily in 
the fair use balance.   
What is more, the district court has twice determined that the defendants were the 
prevailing parties and were entitled to their reasonable attorneys’ fees for having 
prevailed on a significant majority of the litigated claims.  It so ruled despite 
acknowledging the reasonableness of the publishers’ legal positions and the unsettled 
nature of the legal issues presented—in other words, in disregard of the teachings of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.83 
The Eleventh Circuit has now reversed the lower court twice, most recently 
following the delivery of this lecture.84  In its initial ruling, the court of appeals found, 
among other errors, that the lower court had given undue weight to educational 
purpose, and far too little weight to the substantial likelihood of market harm to the 
plaintiff publishers arising out of the plainly substitutional nature of GSU’s practices.  
Notably, the circuit court indicated that factor four was to be given the greatest 
weight in the overall balancing. 
On remand, the district court found still fewer works to have been infringed—in 
the process, reinterpreting the all-important fourth factor market harm test in a 
manner that made it virtually impossible for any of the plaintiff publishers to 
surmount it.  Its articulation of the market harm test gave short shrift to the 
importance to academic publishers, not merely of book sales, but of license income 
derived from digital exploitations of their works. 
In its second reversal, the Eleventh Circuit chastised the district court for having 
failed to heed its direction as to proper application of factor four to thirty-one of the 
forty-eight book excerpts in issue,85 as well as for, a second time, having improperly 
established a mathematical formula for weighing the four fair use factors, as opposed 
to engaging in a holistic analysis.86  The court directed that factor four be awarded 
to the plaintiff publishers with respect to each of the thirty-one takings,87 and 
reiterated the substantial weight that must be given to factor four in the overall fair 
use evaluation.88  Because of these errors, the appellate court also vacated the award 
of attorneys’ fees to the defendants.89  The case was once again remanded to the 
district court to apply the correct legal standards to the thirty-one excerpts involved.    
 
I close with this discussion of the GSU case because, in many ways, it 
encapsulates everything that is exciting, dynamic, and unpredictable about the 
private practice of copyright law in our age.   
It involves an enduring debate as to the reach of the fair use doctrine posed in a 
setting enabled by digital technology that tests the reach of established analog era 
 
 83. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979, 1979 (2016) (finding that the district 
court was required to give substantial weight to the reasonableness of the publisher’s litigating position). 
 84. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Albert, 906 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2018).  
 85. Id. at 1299. 
 86. Id. at 1301.  
 87. Id. at 1302.  
 88. Id. at 1300.  
 89. Id. at 1302.  
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precedent.  It implicates broad communities of interest on both the rights holder and 
user sides, featuring fiery blogosphere commentary and amici ranging from former 
Registers of Copyright to university presses to academic and corporate librarians.  It 
reaffirms that judges bring their own strong perspectives to these cases—and that 
predicting outcomes is indeed hazardous. 
I wouldn’t have given this up for anything! 
Thank you very much. 
